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ABS'ffiACI' .

Looking at the economic fortunes of the English-speakin g Caribbean over
the last fifteen years, we find that countries with the greatest promise have
had a record of chronic instability.

'Ihis paper tries to discriminate between

the inpact of unsettled world economic conditions and of domestic economic
policies on the outcome for individual countries. We measure the inpact of
oil crises, world stagflation, interest rate variability and exchange rate
uncertainty.

We find that the performance of the world econ0Jl1Y curtailed

growth prospects everywhere in the Caribbean and increased the difficulty of
economic management for all countries.

'Ihough the inpact of world conditions

varied greatly from country to country, that external influence does not
account for the variety of performance.

'Ihe extent of economic deterioration

seems more closely related to the policies governments undertook in reaction
to the changed external circumstances.

In general, less adventurous policies

seemed to have been more helpful or less danaging.
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Simul ating Extern al Shocks

Introduc tion

Although the economic performa nce of all
English- speaking Caribbea n economi esl in the 1970s and 1980s was
below expecta tions, the most striking feature of the period was
the fact that countrie s which seemed to have the greates t promise
in 1970 suffered the most serious relapses .

The years after 1970

did turn out to be much more troubleso me than anyone had
conceive d, with bewilde ring exchange rate fluctuat ions, sudden
oil price increase s, stagflat ion in industr ial countrie s and a
deep recessio n in the 1980s.

These developm ents destabil ized all

Caribbea n economi es, even that of Trinidad and Tobago, which
stood to gain from oil price increase s.

I

Terms of trade became

highly variable , with losses for the post-197 0 period as a whole
in almost all cases: export markets weakened and all countrie s
were subject to inflatio nary pressure through imports.

The

challeng e of attainin g growth with economic stabilit y was more
formida ble than expected .
However, it was the policies adopted in the light of
these circumst ances that distingu ished countrie s remainin g in
tolerab le shape from those that regresse d economi cally.

Those

countrie s that adopted fairly conserv ative demand managem ent
policies seem to have fared rather better than the less cautious .
In particu lar, careful fiscal policies were a feature of the more
stable economi es, while fiscal excesses were hardly ever
correcte d for, although some valiant efforts were made.

Other

demand managem ent tools such as monetary variable s and the

exchange rate appear to have had less powerfu l effects, and their
impact was never sufficie nt to compens ate if the governm ent
budget deficit was too large.
It is a disappoi ntment that Caribbea n economie s cannot
boast of much success in stimulat ing the supply of output, a
stated goal of most adjustme nt programm es.

Adjustm ent is less

painful if the country increase s the supply of goods and services
at the same time that people are being called upon to spend
relative ly less on tradeab les.

Supply seems to respond very

sluggish ly to changes in relative prices, which are the principa l
lever availabl e to governm ent.

Moreove r, it can be difficu lt to

achieve changes in relative .pr~ces in the open economy.

In

Jamaica, which went much further than any other Caribbea n country
in its attempt to alter relative prices, severe currency
devalua tion was necessar y before results were noticeab le.

The

argumen t about the nature of supply response s is not resolved .
Everyone agrees that they take a long time to emerge, and those
who pin their faith on supply response s to relative price changes
maintain that sufficie ntly large movemen ts are of recent vintage,
and it is too early to enter a judgeme nt.

on the other hand, if

the obstacle s to increase d supply are institut ional, price
changes will not suffice.
Although the impact of developm ents in the industri al
world varied from country to country, all experien ced periods of
economic adversit y brought on by weakenin g export markets,
worsenin g terms of trade, high interest rates on internat ional
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financ ial market s and variati ons in exchan ge rates among the
curren cies of indust rial nations .

The harshe r circum stances of

the 1970s and 1980s preclud ed gains in per capita income such as
the Caribbe an had witness ed in the 1960s and elimina ted whatev er
chances there might have been of betteri ng trouble some levels of
unemplo yment charac teristi c of the region .

Jamaica suffere d most

severe ly from these outside forces: Guyana had one episode of
good fortune , a second of very bad: Trinida d and Tobago 's oil
industr y gave it an advanta ge from the price increas e, but sowed
the seeds of disequ ilibriu m which emerged when the oil market
softene d.

Howeve r, differe nces in the extern al impact are not

suffic ient to explain differe nces in perform ance, nor does the
deterio ration in major econom ic indica tors date,fr om the time of
the most severe extern al pressu re.

Econom ies which failed to

restore extern al paymen ts balance soon after the initial shock
found themse lves defenc eless in the face of subseq uent
disturb ances, which, in genera l, had greate r potent ial to do
damage , and were more prolong ed.
The presen t paper aims to amplify and demons trate this
interp retatio n of the recent experie nce of English speakin g
Caribbe an countr ies.

We begin with a view of the econom ies as

they must have appeare d around 1970, matchi ng their subseq uent
perform ance agains t the prospe cts that might have been projec ted
from that year.

Becaus e econom ic events in the world outside the

Caribbe an took such an unexpe cted course , our next section
analyse s the effects on the region of such factors as terms of
trade moveme nts, stagfla tion in indust rial countr ies, floatin g
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exchange rates and volatile interest rates.

The economic

policies used to cope with the unforeseen turn of events are
reported in the next section, and this is followed by an
assessment of their efficacy.

We offer some concluding

observations on the lessons to be drawn.
The Contrast between Expectations and Performance
Although they both had serious problems of unemployment
and uneven distribution of resources, Jamaica and Guyana were the
countries with greatest promise in 1970. Each country had a good
record of recent growth, encouraging market prospects for its
exports, unexploited natural resources, and some of the skills
needed for the development process.

These proved to be the

countries turning in the worst performance, with real income per
head in 1984 falling below that for 1970, by a considerable amount
in Guyana's case.

Trinidad and Tobago, which was not expected to

do particularly well, enjoyed a period of immense prosperity
following the first oil price rise, but output tailed off in the
1980s.

Barbados and the Bahamas did a little better than was

expected~

the remaining countries offered no surprises, although

some experienced occasional growth phases.
claim to have adjusted successfully.

No country could

Unemployment remained high

everywhere - higher than in 1970, for most countries - and there
was little success in promoting a strong upward trend in exports.
Judging from the rate of accumulation of bank deposits and other
financial instruments, domestic savings potential was high, but
investment remained sluggish.
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In 1970, output in Jamaica was expanding, the rate of
inflation was modest and external payments were in balance.

The

outlook was good for two of Jamaica's major foreign exchange
earnings sectors:

there was strong, growing demand for bauxite

and alumina and for Jamaica's tourist services.

However, in the

sugar industry, third in importance as a source of foreign
exchange, prices were unremunerative at current production costs,
and output had begun to falter.

The domestic savings rate was

adequate and investment strong.

However, economic growth had not

been sufficiently buoyant to cut down on a high rate of
unemployment, particularly in view of the low labour requirements
of the fastest growing sectors.
The economy continued to do reasonably well until 1973,
but in 1974 a very large balance of payments deficit and a fall in
real output marked the start of a period of continuing economic
difficulty for the Jamaican economy.

A series of economic

programmes failed to restore external balance, output did not
recover and investors began to lose confidence in the country's
prospects.

The 1980s recession in the industrial world found the

Jamaican economy still in disequilibrium; with the additional
loss in output the recession imposed, it proved impossible to
correct the external position.

Balance of payments losses were

increasingly severe, output contracted year after year, prices
rose more quickly and unemployment reached nearly one-third of
the labour force by 1984.
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Guya na's econo mic prosp ects in 1970 seeme d just as
prom ising as Jama ica's.

The econo my was growi ng, infla tion was

low and exter nal payme nts were in balan ce.
Jamai ca the proble m of high unemp loyme nt.

Guyan a share d with
The count ry was well

endow ed with natur al resou rces - agric ultur al land,
mine rals,
timbe r and hydro -elec tric poten tial - altho ugh they
were all
expen sive to explo it.

Guyan a produ ced baux ite, and in 1970 was

the only expo rter of calci ned baux ite, a speci al produ
ct used in
the makin g of steel . The Guyan ese were more comp etitiv
e than
their Carib bean neigh bours in the produ ction of sugar
, and were
able to break even at 1970 price s. Outpu t of rice was
fallin g in
1970, but there were a numbe r of other activ ities fores try,
fi_shi ng, cattl e, light manu factu ring - which seeme d
to offer
scope for expan sion.
polit ical.

The major quest ion marks were socia l and

There had been alleg ation s of wides pread irreg ulari ties

in the elect ions which conso lidate d Mr. Forbe s Burnh
am's majo rity
in parlia ment , and polit ics and socie ty were divid ed
along racia l
lines , betwe en Guyan ese of Afric an and India n desce nt.
The Guyan ese econo my did rathe r well up to 1976.

Outpu t

contr acted a littl e in 1972 and 1973, the rate of infla
tion moved
upwar ds and a surge in impo rts cause d the balan ce of
payme nts to
be in defic it. But the econo my recov ered stron gly,
thank s to the
rise in expor t price s in 1974 and 1975.
In 1976 sugar price s
colla psed, curta iling the growt h of natio nal incom e
and
depre ssing tax reven ues with gover nmen t caugh t midwa
y in a large
expan sion progra mme.

The Bank of Guyan a was requi red to provi de
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considerable financing ~or government, and the resulting
expenditure on imports produced a large balance of payments
deficit.

At the same time, output began to fall, partly because

of reorganisation following the nationalization of large segments
of the economy.

By means of tight expenditure policies, the

government was able to secure a gradual improvement in the
balance of payments between 1978 and 1980, though at the expense
of a reduction in real income.

However, the second oil shock

caused the balance of payments to slide once more, and income
continued to decline.
In 1970 Trinidad and Tobago's oil industry was giving
cause for concern.

Crude oii production was on the decline ?nd

new refineries were being located elsewhere in the Caribbean.
There was no other export sector with the capacity to make up for
lost oil revenue.

However, for the moment the national income was

still growing in real terms, price increases were not excessively
rapid and the external position was not fundamentally out of
balance.

Unemployment was at 10%; although this was the lowest

rate to be found in the English-speaking Caribbean, there
remained a permanent segment of the labour force for whom no jobs
could be provided.
The increase in international oil prices in 1973 marked a
turning point in the Trinidad-Tobago economy.

It coincided with

the opening of a new oil field, and an uptrend in crude oil
production.

The interval from 1973 to 1978 was one of

prosperity, with rising real income, very large balance of
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payments surpluses and falling unemployment .

However, prices

rose very quickly, pushing up domestic costs to such an extent
that production of tradable goods, such as sugar, other
agricultural exports and manufacturin g, declined, since they
could no longer be supplied at competitive prices.

Between 1979

and 1984 difficulties emerged as national expenditure gained
increasing momentum and payments for imports overtook receipts of
foreign exchange.

The external disequilibriu m was only

temporarily alleviated by the second big oil price increase, in
1979.

World oil markets weakened immediately aferwards, while

Trinidad's production of crude oil declined.

Output growth

slowed and balance of payments deficits sharply reduced the stock
of foreign exchange reserves built up during the 1970s.
The Barbados economy was growing in 1970, but more slowly
than it had in the late 1960s.

The prospects remained fair for

tourism, which had grown to be the most important source of
foreign exchange, and there was some development in the re-export
o.f cut garments stitched in Barbados.

However, sugar production

had fallen and farmers were making losses at current export
prices.

Barbados had not set up a central bank in 1970r although

private banks might have financed balance of payment deficits
there seemed no tendency to do so, and the external accounts
remained balanced.

Price increases were moderate, but the

country shared the general unemployment problem of the Caribbean.
The economy was jolted in 1973 and 1974, when output fell,
a large deficit emerged on the external payments accounts, jobs
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I.

were lost and the rate of inflation reached record levels.
However, in the subsequent recovery, which lasted until 1980,
these tendencies were all reversed.

A new and much more severe

recession struck in 1981: prices rose once more, though they soon
abated as the US and UK brought their inflation under control.
The balance of payments, with a record deficit in 1981, was
brought into balance by tightening expenditure.

The fall in

output was arrested only in 1984, and unemployment at the end of
the period was higher than in 1970.
In 1970 the Bahamas seemed to have a promising economic
future, based on continuing growth of tourism; the major problem
was the economy's extreme dependence on the US business cycle.
Belize had agricultu~~l, tourism and forestry potential, but
very little of the infrastructure needed to exploit them.

The

country was also under threat from Guatemala, which claimed
sovereignty over its entire territory.

Agriculture in the

islands of the East Caribbean was in decline, partly because of
prices but largely because of neglected maintenance and low
investment in technology and agronomy.

The islands had some

potential for tourism, but the required investment in transport
systems, public utilities and communications was large in
comparison with national financial resources.
The Bahamas, Belize and the East Caribbean all suffered
setbacks in the early 1970s, with the impact of rising prices for
their imports, fluctuating prices for exports and a fall in North
American tourist travel.

Expenditures adjusted as incomes fell,
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with little attempt to finance excess spending.

(None of these

countries had a central bank in 1970, and they were not·yet
members of the World Bank or IMF: their only s·ources of
short-term financing were through bilateral government agreements
and the efforts of private banks.)

It appears that those

countries that produced sugar (Belize, St. Kitts) and those that
had developed tourism (Bahamas, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Lucia)
recovered some ground in the late 1970s.

(Prior to the

mid-1970s, macroeconomic data on most countries is limited to
trade, output of one or two major commodities and some banking
statistics.)

The remaining countries, exporting bananas for the

most part, did not do as well.

The recession in the industrial

world had serious effects on all these economi~s, beginning
around 1980 with rapid inflation.

Some balance of payments

financing was now available, and several countries borrowed from
the .IMF and World Bank.

Except for Belize and the Bahamas,

governments were strictly limited in their ability to borrow from
the monetary authority, and runaway fiscal spending was not
possible.

The Bahamas government kept its deficit within

tolerable bounds, but the deficit/GDP ratio in Belize rose
sharply in the 1980s.

Tourism once again helped some countries

to a partial recovery, but in general output remained sluggish
and incomes depressed in 1984.

The Effects of Economic Conditions outside the Caribbean
Conditions in the outside world provoked balance of
payments disequilibria, generated inflation and retarded output
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growth everywhere in the Caribbean._ Foreign exchange receipts
were adversely affected by the downtrend in the demand for
bauxite and alumina, while tourism was subject to cycles in
demand which mirrored the ups and downs of real income in the.
industrial world.

(For other commodities demand was infinitely

large in comparison with Caribbean output.)

The terms of trade

moved against the Caribbean2, with a succession of. high annual
import price increases in the 1970s.

The prices of Caribbean

exports also rose, sometimes very quickly, but the increases were
seldom sustained over many years.

Only the prices of bauxite and

oil kept up with increases in wholesale prices in the US and the
UK, and with the prices of exports.

(The wholesale and export

prices are the best indicators we have of price trends at the
main sources of Caribbean imports.)

Among the main commodities

exported from the Caribbean, bauxite prices held up in the 1970s,
but fell in 1980; the price of sugar fell in real terms (i.e.
deflated by an index of foreign prices, based on the US and UK),
even for sales under the agreement with the EEC.

The price of

rice rose steadily up to 1975, but fell thereafter and was
significantly down in real terms over the period as a whole.
Banana prices improved on returns experienced in the 1960s, but
their prices too were down in real terms.

The volatility of

export prices created special problems, with sudden windfalls
alternating with longer periods of comparatively low returns.
The price instability also affected the outcome of negotiations
✓

for the Lorne agreement (between the EEC and the African-Carib bean
Pacific group of countries), in particular the size of sugar
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,

quotas; Lome was concluded at a time when the sugar market was

very confused, and old-establish ed marketing arrangements had
been thrust aside.

Since the agreement was based on the

prevailing'd istribution of sugar sales, countries which had
attempted to sell to new markets were left with short quotas.
In the 1970-84 period most Caribbean countries recorded
smaller investment inflows than in the 1960s, which had
witnessed investment for mining, hotels and manufacturin g.

The

1970s saw commercial banks emerge as the main conduit for
financial flows from industrial countries to LDCs.

The

commercial banks seldom made loans with maturities beyond the
medium-term; when they replaced investors as the dominant source
of. international flows, borrowe·rs were .faced w1 th shortening
maturities and heavier immediate amortisation burdens.

In

addition, bank lending broke the link between debt service and
economic performance; loans must be serviced whether the
investment they finance is performing well or not, whereas
returns to direct investment depend on the surpluses earned by
the project financed.

The investment slowdown curtailed the

supply of foreign exchange, while the changes in lending
instruments meant that borrowers enjoyed a smaller measure of
security from holding a given stock of foreign exchange reserves.
Very high real interest rates in internationa l financial
markets in the 1980s imposed severe foreign exchange losses on
countries which had borrowed heavily abroad in their efforts to
balance external receipts

-~-I"l_c1 _pa~ents during '!:he 1970s.

Barbados, Guyana and many of the island states of the East Caribbean
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were affected, but it was in Jamaica tha~ the interest charges
absorbed the most sizeable portion of the national savings.

If

the average payments on the external debt had been no higher than
the rate of increase in the index of foreign prices, Jamaica
might have saved substantial foreign exchange between 1981 and
1984 3 •

Because of high interest rates, a level of external

borrowing which seemed prudent in the 1970s became insupportable
in the 1980s.
Sustained increases in foreign prices boosted inflation
rates in the Caribbean during the 1970s, with relief coming only
in the 1980s.

The pressure from abroad was particularly fierce

between 1973 and 1975 and in 1979, but throughout the decade
foreign prices were increasing at more than five percent a year,
much faster than for the 1950s and 1960s.

They drove up the

prices of final consumer goods imported, the costs of imported
raw materials and capital goods and, eventually, wage costs as
well.

Once workers began to expect high rates of price increase

from year to year they adjusted wage demands to defend incomes
against erosion in their real value.
The potential for growth in national income was much lower
than for the 1960s, in all cases except for Trinidad and Tobago.
For the majority it would have been difficult to improve the
observed output trends significantly, given the weaknesses of
many export markets and export prices.

The other disturbances

from the outside - foreign price increases, high interest rates,
variation in exchange rates - had little effect on output, though
they were all uncomfortable in other ways.
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The balance of paymen ts disegu ilibria , inflati onary__
pressu res and loss of growth potent ial created decisio n problem s
of two kinds.

First, the already trouble some unemplo yment

problem became more intract able: not only were there few jobs
being created in the tradab le sector, surplus es for transfe r to
the non-tra dable sector (notabl y governm ent) were low, denying
the possib ility of job creatio n in labour -intens ive non-tra dable
activit y.

Second , more skillfu l and active policy making was

needed to cope with the swiftly changin g environ ment.

All

the policy making institu tions in the Caribbe an are quite
young, in contra st to those in indust rial countr ies, and
their capabi lities were put to an early, rigorou s and
unforg iving test.
(a) Jamaic a
Jamaic a's net foreign exchang e earning s were
curtail ed by terms of trade losses, slack demand for bauxite
and tourism , and the costs of debt servici ng in later years.
There were terms of trade losses continu ously from 1971 to
1977 and again in 1979.

The world demand for bauxite

slacken ed in the 1970s and fell sharply in the 1980s,
followi ng trends in world alumini um produc tion.

Produc tion

slowed and then decline d in the larges t exporti ng countr ies,
Austra lia and Guinea , althoug h Jamaica did worse than
average becaus e of domest ic policie s affecti ng the bauxite
industr y.

(In partic ular, a levy on produc tion introdu ced

unilat erally in 1974 invited retalia tion by produc ing
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companies.)

The demand for Jamaica's tourist services

followed the economic cycle in North America~ downturns in
1974/75 and between 1979 and 1983 were reflected in fewer
tourist arrivals and low levels of hotel occupancy.

All Caribean

destinations were affected, but once again events in Jamaica made
for a worse slump than was to be found in other tourist
destinations.4
The decline in foreign investment in LDCs by industrial
countries was only one of a number of factors which made for a
major contraction in the volume of foreign investment in Jamaica.
The bauxite-alumina industry was just past its growth phase, and
the heavy foreign investment needed to bring production to the
1970s level would not be repeated.

The levy on bauxite

production evidently caused companies to try to reduce their
investment exposure in Jamaica, and in general the government was
less sympathetic to foreign investors.

In addition, social

upheaval undermined the country's reputation for stability, a
factor which plays a large role in the choice of plant location
by multinational firms.

There was some divestment by foreigners,

and government bought a number of hotels form overseas firms
which had decided to close operations in Jamaica.

Even if

Jamaica had retained its attraction to foreign investors the
inflow of funds would have failed to match that for the 1960s, in
real terms;

however, most of the loss of foreign inflows was a

result of Jamaica's own policies.
The cost of debt servicing threatened to keep Jamaica in
permanent balance of payments disequilibrium in the 1980s;
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a

consi derab le porti on of decli ning real incom e was devot
ed to
-·

inter est paym ents.

Even with heroi c effor ts to reduc e natio nal

expen ditur e, the surpl uses for savin g were badly impai
red.
circu mstan ces were partl y due to dome stic polic ies;

These

if the

macro econo mic polic ies of the late 1970s had been more
succe ssful , Jama ica's exter nal debt would not have been
so large
nor the inter est paym ents so cripp ling.

Howe ver, at the time it

was contr acted the debt was thoug ht manag eable, not
only by the
Jama icans , but by lende rs, inclu ding the IMF, under
whose
auspi ces most of the borro wing arran geme nts were contr
acted .
In contr ast to the impli catio ns for the balan ce of paym
ents,
which were sever e from 1971 onwa rds, exter nal force s
depre ssed
Jama ica's econo mic growt h only in the 1980s . ' Durin g
most of the
1970s the count ry would not have been able to impro ve
signi fican tly on obser ved econo mic perfo rmanc e (if polic
ies had
remai ned the same) had the terms of trade and the deman
d for
baux ite and touris m follow ed the trend s of the 1960s
.

Howe ver,

in the 1960s the econo my seems to have been drive n well
below
that poten tial.
There were two perio ds, 1973- 76 and 1980- 84, when exter
nal
influ ences creat ed balan ce of paym ents probl ems for
Jama ica;

the

first was also chara cteriz ed by stron g infla tiona ry
press ure from
abroa d, while outpu t was serio usly depre ssed in the
secon d
insta nce.

The earli er episo de was preci pitat ed by vola tile terms

of trade , slack ening deman d for some expor ts and a fall
in
forei gn inves tmen t.

The balan ce of payme nts crisi s could only

have been corre cted by a sacri fice of real outpu t, even
with
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approp riate adjustm ent policie s.

There was insuff icient finance

availab le with maturi ties long enough to allow for stabili sation
with growth .
greate r.

In the 1980s the losses on export market s were much

In additio n, externa l paymen ts were already in

disequ ilibriu m becaus e of failure of· adjustm ent policie s in the
1970s.

Under the circum stances the availab le finance did not

permit of any adjustm ent program me that did not involve a harsh
reducti on in real output, particu larly in view of the high cost
of finance .5
(b) Guyana
In Guyana , there is a contra st betwee n 1972-7 7, when the
impact of econom ic develop ments in the wider world boosted
foreign exchan ge receipt s and speeded up the growth of income ,
and the 1978-8 4 period , when both terms of trade and extern al
demand worked agains t the econom y's prospe cts for growth and
balanc e of paymen ts equilib rium.

The favoura ble influen ces of

the first period arose from the fact that Guyane se sugar
produc tion was relativ ely high at the time when sugar prices
peaked , and Guyana made very large foreign exchang e gains.
Further more increas es in the price of rice boosted earning s up to
1975 and bauxit e prices stayed firm during the 1970s.

The

turnaro und in extern al influen ces was signall ed by the fall in
sugar prices in 1976, and by the stagna tion of prices for rice at
about the same time.

Bauxite prices fell in the 19R0s, along

with the demand for the produc t.
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The full effect of import prices on inflation in the
Guyanese economy does not show in the price index because of
extensive controls on official_prices.

Nevertheless, a

significant impact appears on official prices.

The controls

probably exaggerated the inflationary effects of foreign prices
beyond what they otherwise have been, by creating artificial
shortages and hoarding and by diverting a large proportion of
consumer demand to unofficial markets.
Foreign exchange inflows during the first part of the
1970s afforded Guyana the opportunity to increase savings and
invest in ventures to exploit the nation's untapped resources.
That opportunity was not taken, and spending on current items
increased to absorb most of the additional income.

Even if more

had been saved, the economy would still have been in great
difficulty in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, because of the
magnitude of the external impact, and the fact that few
investments would have borne fruit so soon.

The country's

potential output was reduced during this period and balance of
payments disequilibria could have been avoided only by cutting
back real income.

(c) Barbados
For Barbados there were two periods when events abroad went
against the economy, interspersed with a few years when they were
of benefit.

In the years from 1973 to 1977 the demand for

tourist services stagnated and then fell, while there was a very
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-rapid increase in import prices.
high levels, but soon fell.

The price of sugar rose to very

These developm ents helped to create

a short-li ved balance of payments deficit, and contribu ted to the
contrac tion of output in 1q74 and 1975.

The import price rise

was the principa l cause of the virulent inflatio n recorded in
1973 and 1974.

During the period 1978-80 import price increase s

abated, the demand for tourism picked up and nationa l output
grew, with consider able moderati on of inflatio n.

The eighties

opened with another bout of import inflatio n, but that soon
subsided .

It was followed by a slump in tourism.

Balance of

payments deficits were recorded and output contrac ted, but
inflatio n rates fell to the region of five percent .
(d) Other Countri es··
Output in other Caribbea n countrie s is driven by one major
export - bananas , sugar, tourism, and, for Trinidad and Tobago,
petroleu m

products .

The price of bananas increase d througho ut

the period, with big jumps in 1975 and in the period 1978-80.
The Windward islands reaped some benefit, but in Jamaica, the
other English speaking Caribbea n produce r, output fell to very
low levels.
Sugar producin g countrie s made gains and then suffered
losses from the price fluctuat ions already discusse d, while
countrie s with an importan t tourism sector experien ced two
periods of slack demand.

In rrost cases nationa l expendi ture fell

as output ano foreign exchange contract ed.
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By and large,

domestic inflation followed import price trends.

These factors

made for an erratic growth path, even for the few countries where
real output seems to have been higher at the end of the period
than it was for the earliest year when we can estimate it (this
varies from country to country).
In Trinidad and Tobago external influences in the form of
oil price increases proved highly inflationary and domestic costs
rose so quickly that many non-oil exportables were no longer
competitive.

Inflation was also stimulated also by an excess

demand for non-tradeable s, largely the result of financial
inflows from oil.

A further inflationary factor arising from the ,.

same source was congestion at the seaport, which led to excess
demand for imports .. _With the decline iri oil prices in the 1980s,
the balance of payments went into substantial deficit.
Economic Policies
The economic policies of all the English Caribbean
countries were quite similar from 1970 to about 1973.

Their

governments all faced comparable circumstance s, with some
continuing growth of output, but a need to reduce unemployment
and to control newly emerging deficits on the balance of
payments.

In one or two cases the rate of inflation had begun to

speed up.

Most countries tried to dampen expenditure, by

ensuring budget deficits of modest proportion and by placing
restrictions on the availability of credit to the private sector,
when there was the mechanism to do so.

-20-

The effect of stagflation in the industrial world and
rising oil prices was to induce very high inflation and large
balance of payments deficits, followed in almost all cases, by
windfall gains from the short-lived rise in commodity prices.
Reaction to these circumstances varied greatly from country to
country.

The Guyana and Jamaica governments utilized windfall

gains to expand current national expenditure, while Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago attempted to sterilize some of the proceeds
for later investment.

Other countries were limited in their

capacity for active fiscal policy because, except for the Bahamas
and Belize, they had no monetary authority that could be used to
accommodate government borrowing.

None of them took active steps

to neutralize foreign gains and their economies seem to have
fluctuated in accordance with the variations in foreign exchange
receipts.
As the economic fortunes of Caribbean countries diverged
from 1976 onwards, their economic policies grew apart as well.
To some extent this was a result of the need to address different
problems:

Guyana and Jamaica needed policies to achieve foreign

exchange balance, a problem which did not confront other
countries at that time.

However, differences in the philosophy

of economic management began to emerge as well.

Guyana adopted a

strategy based on state control and central direction of major
economic activity in all areas of production and distribution .
The system featured a wide panoply of controls on consumption and
the disposition of resources.

Other countries continued to rely
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on the adjustme nt of prices and the use of inducem ents and
directiv es designed to influenc e the behaviou r of agents in the
private sector, although there was some state ownersh ip of
enterpri se everywh ere.
The individu al governm ent's policy stance was often
motivate d by the country 's economic circumst ances.

Trinidad and

Tobago, with large foreign exchange surpluse s, embarked on a
programm e which boosted national expendi ture, reversin g earlier
policies which contribu ted to increase d savings.

The Barbados

governm ent's policy was mildly restrict ive, with growing fiscal
saving on the current account and some credit restrict ions as the
main levers.

The Jamaican governm ent made attempts to con~ain

national expendi ture and to divert it from foreign to domestic
goods, using adjustme nts to the governm ent budget, exchange rate
changes, credit restrict ions and directiv es on the disposit ion of
foreign exchange .

The mix of policies depended on the size of

the balance of payments deficit that had to be reduced or
eliminat ed and the underlyi ng trend in output.

Countrie s with

most serious balance of payments tended to rely more heavily on
exchange and import controls :

where the economy was contrac ting

year after year we are more likely to observe exchange rate
adjustm ent.

Fiscal policies featured promine ntly in every case,

and there were a variety of measures designed to influenc e money
and credit.

Exchange controls played a central role in Guyana,

Jamaica and (very recently ) Trinidad and Tobago, but they were
not applied very stringen tly in the other countrie s.

Jamaica

made active use of exchange rate adjustme nt, and Guyana also
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devalued the currency on occasion, but other countries largely
eschewed this instrument.

Jamaica's policies, which owed

something to IMF influence (adjustment was carried out under
programmes agreed with the IMF between 1977 and 1979 and from
1981 onwards), were a hybrid of fiscal changes, price adjustment
and direct controls, with external financing.

The Barbados

programme tended to focus on fiscal adjustment, mild credit
restriction and external financing.
All countries shared in the economic difficulties of the
1980s, and they were all obliged to take measures to reduce
spending.

The instruments preferred did not change much, though

they had to be applied in different directions (in the case of
I

Trinidad and Tobago) and· with greater intensity.

Guyana

maintained the command economy, though government showed signs of
willingness to relax its hold as all indicators of economic
performance steadily worsened.

In Jamaica a new administration,

elected in 1980, dismantled some quantitive restrictions on
imports but the content of the programme was little changed in
other respects.

However, fiscal contraction was far more severe

than it had been under the previous regime.

Both Barbados and

Trinidad-Tobago sought to achieve adjustment largely by trimming
government budgetsr

the Trinidad-Tobago authorities also

determined on highly restrictive import and exchange controls
after local manufacturers had priced themselves out of domestic
and regional markets.
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(a) Jamaica
The Jamaican economy expanded in the early 1970s, but there
were repeated balance of payments deficits and prices tended to
rise more quickly each year.

The authorit ies introduc ed measures

to contain expendit ure between 1972 and the first half of 1974.
They included import restrict ions, increase s in the reserves the
Bank of Jamaica required commerc ial banks to hold, increase s in
some tax rates and a penal discoun t rate for Bank of Jamaica
advances to commerc ial banks.

In mid-1974 the Jamaica governm ent

replaced the system of taxing bauxite companie s with a new levy
on producti on which was so large as to increase fiscal revenues
in that year by 50%.
I

Commodi ty prices rose in 1974, and the

economic outlook seemed to have improved .

Governm ent determin ed

on an expansio nary programm e, abruptly reversin g the previous
measure s to hold down expendi ture.

A

very consider able

governm ent expendit ure programm e was launched , involvin g large
outlays to create new jobs to be paid out of the current account.
The expansio n absorbed the addition al proceeds of the bauxite
levy in the first year.
Economic output turned downward s almost immedia tely,
however .

Producti on problems were experien ced in the sugar

industry , overseas travel by American tourists was down and
foreign investme nt had begun to slow down.

Eventua lly bauxite

compani es cut back producti on in Jamaica in favour of other
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producers, though-there was little evidence of this in the first
few years after the bauxite levy was introduced.

National

expenditure remained very high, fuelled in part by fiscal
spending.

National output fell, the external payments were in

deficit and inflation quickened.
relatively mild policy:

Government responded with

tighter import controls, tax incentives

to producers and price controls.
There was a little improvement in the indicators of
economic performance and by 1977 it was clear that firmer
measures would be necessary.

Over the next three years the

authorities devalued the currency, introduced multiple exchange
rates and, a crawling peg for a short period, announced budgets
for the use of foreign exchange (to be managed by the Bank of
Jamaica), revised exchange controls, imposed additional
quantitative restrictions on imports and promulgated price and
wage guidelines.

In most cases the measures were undertaken in

association with an IMF loan agreement, and they were supported
by large amounts of medium-term financing (3-5 years) from
international institutions and commercial banks.
performance fell consistently below expectations.

Economic
Each of three

IMF programmes was suspended because agreed targets were not
attained;

output stagnated while repeated balance of payments

deficits eliminated foreign exchange reserves and reduced the
country's credit-worthiness.

A new round of adverse
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shocks-from abroad, beginning in 1979, aggravated the crisis.
After a period of inertia in the closing months of the Manley
administratio n, the Seaga government introduced new packages,
beginning in 1981.

The instruments used were much the same, with

greater emphasis on fiscal contraction, more frequent exchange
rate changes, and a reduction in the number and scope of
quantitative restrictions.

A willingness to tolerate very high

interest rates was the only major distinction between the
policies of the late 1970s and those of the 1980s. ·
was supported by additional borrowing.

The programme

Whatever its merits,

prospects for successful adjustment were diminished by a marked
decline in the demand for bauxite and alumina and by the effects
I
of the U.S. recession on tourism.

{b) Barbados
In Barbados no central bank existed in 1970, and the country
shared its currency with seven other islands in the East
Caribbean.

Government's ability to sustain deficits depended on

its success in competing with private firms and individuals for
bank credit and on its credit-worthi ness abroad.

There were no

provisions for influencing credit, and exchange rate changes and
exchange controls proved difficult to implement because of the
need to secure agreement among the eight governments
participating in the currency arrangements .
_ The economic: displace:rr1.ent _which <?CC:u~r~d ~n Barbados in
1973-74 was largely self-correcti ng, thanks to the increase in
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sugar prices, the revival of tourism (in 1976) and an abatement
in import price increases.

Government arranged some foreign

borrowing to finance the 1973 deficit on the balance of payments,
and no further adjustment proved necessary.

Very high sugar

prices produced windfall increases in foreign exchange in 1974,
part of which was taxed away for later investment.

Controls on

selected areas of credit were introduced in 1977, remaining in
place for the rest of the period, but there were no other policy
developments of significance in the 1970s.

Fiscal policy was

neither particularly restrictive or expansionary and adjustments
to monetary instruments and the exchange rate were minor and
infrequent.
I

The second disturbance to the Barbadian economy, in the
1980s, was met with active policies for adjustment.

Government

tried briefly to expand expenditure, in 1981, but reversed the
policy the next year, imposing spending limits for each of the
next two years.

The controls on the use of bank credit were

revised, but their impact remained selective rather than general.
Interest rates were raised and a penal rate was imposed for
central bank discounts.
medium-term financ.ing,

The programme was supported by
from commercial banks and the IMF.

(c) Trinidad-Tobago
In the years prior to the oil price increase, Trinidad and
Tobago maintained some controls on consumer credit, but there was
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not much else by way of efforts to influence economic
fluctuatio ns.

With the advent of oil wealth, the governmen t

determine d to set aside a fraction of additiona l revenues for
investmen t in new industry.

This strategy was adhered to for

about two years, but thereafter very rapid increases in
governmen t spending eventually eliminated savings on current
account, and aggravated inflationa ry pressures by adding to
already booming private expenditu re.

With declines in oil price

and output, disequilib rium between income and spending emerged in
the 1980s, and foreign exchange reserves plunged.

Governmen t

responded in the first instance with tighter exchange controls
and more quantitati ve restrictio ns.

Only in 1984, as the loss of

reserves 1 continued without let, did governmen t decide to trim the
fiscal programme .
(d) Guyana
At the outset of the 1970s decade credit controls were the
only economic policy measure taken by the Guyana governmen t.

At

the first impact of external disturbanc es in 1973, there was a
brief episode of fiscal expansion as governmen t tried to sustain
demand.

However, this policy was reversed in the following year

and controls were placed on foreign exchange transactio ns.
Although it was inflationa ry, the first external shock provided
Guyana with windfall foreign receipts, which were partly taxed
away by governmen t.

Governmen t then used the proceeds to

purchase most of the major foreign-ow ned companies operation in
Guyana, absorbing all the accumulate d foreign exchange in the
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process.

Once the sugar windfall ended it became necessary to

trim expenditure:

the exchange controls were retained, price and

wage controls were imposed and government spending was cut, first
by abandoning government capital projects and then by freezing
wages in the civil service.

Some external financing was secured

from the IMF and through government-to-government arrangements.
The second external shock widened the balance of payments deficit
and provoked even sterner fiscal retrenchment.

Output faltered,

partly because of scarcity of foreign exchange, and the state
corporations made heavy losses which added to the fiscal deficit.
The measures taken failed to avert defaults on the majority of
Guyana's foreign obligations and a massive build-up of payments
arrears.

(e) Other Countries
Of the remaining countries the Bahamas and Belize had the
greatest freedom in choosing economic policies.

They both had

independent currencies and central banks were established during
the period.

The other countries shared a currency and a monetary

institution whose statutes allowed only limited finance of
official deficits.

Monetary and exchange rate policies proved

difficult to execute because of the need to secure unanimous
decisions.

In practice, none of these countries went much beyond

the use of the government budget as a policy tool.
deficits were not allowed to persist for long:

Fiscal

in the case of

East Caribbean countries, the limit was set by the rules of the
monetary authority and by financing available from abroad.
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Some

countrie s_negot iated IMF programm es in the 1980s which allowed
more time for expendi ture to adjust to foreign exchange losses,
but in the earlier period, rapid adjustme nt was forced upon them.
The Bahamas and Belize, which might have tried to influenc e the
adjustme nt path, did little towards this end;

governme nt

expendi tures seem to follow trends of revenue and overall
economic performa nce, much as private expendi tures did.

An Assessm ent of Economic Policies
The two periods which called for an active policy response
to displace ment from outside the Caribbea n to output, foreign
exchange receipts and inflatio n were roughly 1973-75 and 1979-83 .
I
The response s and their outcomes suggest the potentia l and
limitati ons of economic policy making in the Caribbea n.

In this

section we combine inferenc es drawn from a comparis on of policies
and economic performa nce with the insights to be derived from an
~conome tric model which was tested for Barbado s, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago.
differen t policies ;

The model indicate s the probable effects of
using its results one may form an opinion

about the impact of various policy packages (Table 2).
Before 1973 Caribbea n economie s were expandin g and no
sustaine d balance of payment deficits were recorded ;

although

unemploy ment remained high and there were some early signs of
inflatio n, authori ties were under no pressure for active
macroeco nomic policies .

That picture changed , for the worse in

most cases, in 1973, when very large balance of payments
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deficits emerged and butput leveled_o ff.

If nothing were done a

foreign exchange crunch threatened to produce economic reversals.
Trinidad and Tobago had the problem of managing a sudden increase
in wealth which was inflationa ry, boosting expenditu res to exceed
the country's capacity to produce and distribute the goods
demanded.

For some countries , terms of trade gains in 1974 and

1975 rectified the balance of payments, with little policy
interventi on.

These countries temporaril y shared

Trinidad-T obago's problem of managing the windfall in a
non~infla tionary way.
The second, more serious and prolonged bout of internatio nally
induced problems began with the oil price increase in 1979. and
I

intensifie d with the North American recession of 1981-83.

It

caused a turnaround in economies which had begun to recover from
the earlier event and it further destabiliz ed those that had not
found a way out of earlier difficulti es.

All were forced to

apply defensive measures.
Economies seem to have fared better where the authoritie s
concentra ted on moderatin g expenditu re in line with the trend in
output, which was governed largely by performan ce in the tradable
goods sectors.

Attempts to make up for the slowdown in the

tradable sectors - usually via expansion of governmen t spending
- ran into difficulty because of the foreign exchange losses
brought on by the additiona l non-tradab le activity.

Countries

that were cautious about fiscal expansion include the Bahamas,
Trinidad and Tobago in 1973 and 1974 and Barbados, from 1981 to
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1983.

Their economic performance compares favourably with three

conspicuous examples of fiscal expansion:

Jamaica (1974-76),

Guyana in 1976 and Trinidad and Tobago from 1976 to 1981.
Fiscal policy has been the cornerstone of programmes that
maintained economic stability, and the downfall of those that
aggravated disequilibria.

Where a policy package restored

balance of payments equilibrium (Barbados, 1981-83) or came close
to doing so (Guyana, 1978-80), tight fiscal policy was the
predominant feature.

The fiscal programme has its most powerful

effect via the direct injections into the spending stream that
come from expanded government activity and the increase in
disposable income achieved by lower tax rates.

The effects. of

government financing, operating through the financial system, are
much less influential.

Because of the large import content of

expenditure, any injection into the income stream has an
immediate effect on the balance of payments.

That impact is

aggravated when there is no corresponding increase in output in
the short-run;

the balance of payments deterioration is more

severe for government expenditure on transfers and wage payments
than it is for increases of the same magnitude in government
services.

The relative potency of fiscal policy, in contrast to

monetary policy, is something theory would have led us to expect.
The economies remain very open to trade and finance despite the
widespread use of exchange controls.

It is therefore difficult

to isolate the local money and credit markets so that their
behaviour can be dictated by the central bank. (Table 2 summarizes
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some effects of official policies, for Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago).
Exchange rate policy seems to operate on the level of
expenditure rather than on the composition of the expenditure
basket.

One reason many advocate exchange rate changes in

preference to other policies is that exchange rate movements are
expected to alter the relative prices of domestic and foreign
goods, saving foreign exchange by switching some spending from
foreign to home goods.

The reduction in overall spending needed

to secure balance in external payments then need not be so
great.

There was a general reluctance in the Caribbean to

experiment with exchange rate policy, so we do not have a great
deal of evidence on its effects.

The experience in Jamaica was

that little expenditure switching took place.

It was difficult

to achieve a noticable change in relative prices; domestic prices
contain too large an import element and wages were highly
sensitive to increases in import prices.

Furthermore, empirical

tests indicate very sluggish effects of changes in relative
prices on the allocation of
non-tradable goods. 6

expenditure between imports and

Insofar as it had an impact the exchange

rate seems to have reduced the level of expenditure by generating
inflation and cutting real income.
Monetary policy suffered from a scarcity of effective tools
of implementatio n.

Jamaica used a variety of monetary measures

in the late 1970s and in the 1980s:

elsewhere some credit

restrictions were imposed at various times by everyone except the
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East Caribbea n countrie s that were members of the joint currency
area (the ECCB).

Barbados and Belize raised interest rates in

the 1980s, and very occasion al increase s in reserve requirem ents
were the only other monetary changes in these countrie s.

The

main elements of Jamaican monetary policy from 1977 onwards were
changes in the reserve requirem ents, interest rate manipul ation
and global restrict ions on bank credit for the private sector.
The credit restrict ions created fertile soil for the growth of
near-ban ks in the 1970s as devices to evade controls .

Apart from

evasion, there may be argumen t about the effect of credit
controls on spending .

There is a statisti cally signific ant

associa tion between credit and expendi ture in the three countrie s
for which we performe d tests (Barbado s, Jamaica and
Trinidad -Tobago ), but we believe the correct interpre tation is
that this reflects the effect of expendi ture on the demand for
credit.

Increase s in reserve requirem ents were sufficie ntly

large to mop up excess liquidit y only on one occasion , for
Jamaica .

In that case, banks recorded surplus liquidit y after a

very short interva l.

The reserve requirem ent therefor e never had

an effect on the level of credit.

Empirica l tests for the three

countrie s mentione d above indicate that changes in reserve
requirem ents will have little effect on the cost of credit, even
where there is no excess liquidit y.

Unless the cost of credit

increase s substan tially, neither output nor expendi ture is much
affected . 7
We do not yet have measures of the impact of interest rate
changes in Belize, Barbados . and Jamaica in-- the 1980s.
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.

--

The

available estimates are dominated by relationships in earlier
years when interest rate changes were quite small, and
consequently the coefficients measuring their influence on
credit, output, and spending are negligible.

However, in

Barbados casual observation suggests some short-term speculation
by firms and individuals holding deposits or making financing
transactions in Barbados and abroad, depending on the
differential between local and foreign rates.

In Jamaica,

interest rates also provided an incentive to repatriate funds
from abroad, but the increased costs of finance appear to have
made firms that depend on bank credit less competitive in the
production of tradables and more expensive in the production of
non-tradables.

These observations
are based
only
on the .claims
•
I
.

of the firms concerned, since we have not empirically separated
these effects from the effects of exchange rate changes, wages
and other factors currently affecting prices and output.

The

interest rate increases in Belize are of very recent vintage, and
their impact is still to be clarified.
The experiences highlight the shortcomings of monetary
instruments.

Reserve requirements bite only when they eliminate

excess reserves.

Their effect depends on the ability to predict

commercial bank reactions in an oligopolistic system, something
which economists in the Caribbean are still attempting to explain.
The reserve requirements must be supported by controls on the
banks' recourse to foreign borrowing and the central bank must be
prepared to close the discount window, so as to deny access to
alternative sources of funds.

Furthermore, there is a tendency
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for near-banks to expand their activities as credit becomes
scarce, and they substitute for the
longer supply.

credit which banks may no

The non-banks also tend to frustrate direct

credit restriction.
If credit restrictions do have an effect, they are more
likely to cause cost inflation than to reduce expenditure because
supply functions seem to be more sensitive to the resulting
increase in finance costs than are spending functions.

The

increase in the costs of financing may force firms to cut back
output, but it is less likely to deter consumers.

Moreover, the

production of tradables goods is more likely to be depressed than
the output of non-tradables ;

the producers of non-tradable s may

raise their prices to compensate for the increased finance costs,
but the producers of tradables face prices which are determined
on world markets, and some of them may no longer be able to
compete.
Raising central bank discount rates, purchase and sale of
government securities from the central bank's portfolio and
directives about interest rate levels are other means by which
the monetary authority may try to influence output and spending.
If they have an impact, it is through induced changes in the cost
of credit, and the results are subject to the qualification s
mentioned above.

An increase in discount rates is effective only

if reserve requirements are raised to mop up all excess liquidity
and banks' access to foreign funds is limited.

Under these

circumstance s banks are forced to finance an excess of credit
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demand ov~r new deposits by discoun ting at the higher ~ate, and
they will pass on the increase d cost to the borrowe r.

If

governm ent wishes to sell securiti es from its portfoli o to
commerc ial banks it must raise their effectiv e yield to compete
credit away from the private sector, unless banks have excess
liquidit y.

If there is excess liquidit y the sale has no effect:

otherwis e it tends to drive up loan rates.
only uncertai n.

These effects are not

They depend heavily on the central banks'

willingn ess to shut off discoun ts or to impose a penal discoun t
rate in circumst ances where the banks are deprived of sources of
funding other than the central bank.

This procedu re carries a

high risk of jeopardi zing commerc ial bank solvency , and no
monetary authorit y in the Caribbea n was prepared to adopt such
draconia n measure s.
The central bank's ability to support an independ ent
interes t rate structur e is circums cribed by the pattern of
foreign interest rates.

If domestic rates are allowed to diverge

too far from compara ble foreign rates, finance flows inward or
outward, irrespec tive of exchange controls .

If the discrepa ncies

between local and foreign rates are not too large (we estimate
about three points between compara ble rates, for the countrie s we
have tested) the flows will be confined to trade credits and the
disposit ion of investme nt income, which allows legitima te
discreti on in the placeme nt of funds at home or abroad.

If the

dicrepan cies become very large, there will be increasi ng resort to
illegal transact ions.

The scope for independ ent interest rate

setting is limited to a corridor around the ruling rate on
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internatio nal financial markets where the co~ts of transferri ng
funds outweighs the potential interest gain, a margin we estimate
at one or two points.
The Caribbean countries all imposed some limits on foreign
exchange transactio ns, but Guyana {from 1973 onwards}, Jamaica
{from 1976} and Trinidad and Tobago {from 1982} were the only
ones to rely on them to control spending.

Foreign exchange

allocation was seen as an alternativ e way of switching
expenditu re from foreign to locally produced goods and services,
but it was not at all successfu l in this role.

It became

profitable to set up machinery to evade exchange controls, and a
large proportion of foreign exchange business was transacted on
unofficia l markets, which were inefficien t and inflationa ry.

The

controls served to reduce expenditu re, rather than to divert
demand to stimulate domestic output.

The profits of illegal

foreign exchange dealers absorbed some of the funds diverted from
imports, and the inflation generated by the reduced efficiency of
foreign exchange trading reduced real spending power somewhat.
Furthermo re, it proved impossible to expand the supply of
home-prod uced goods, largely because of the impact of exchange
controls on the supply of raw materials .

In the three countries

where controls were extensive ly used the central bank's budgeted
foreign exchange allocation s were exceeded on every occasion,
except for one instance in Jamaica {in 1978}.

Even then, an

unexpected decline in real income appears to be the reason for
the reduction, not the foreign exchange budget.
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The governments of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
all tried at some time to control the general price level.

In

other countries only a small selection of items was subject to
price control.

There is little evidence to suggest that general

price controls were useful;

officially recorded price increases

were rather higher for countries with general controls than for
those without, and increases were not noticeably smaller when
controls were in effect, compared with periods when they were
not.

Furthermore, comprehensive controls always provided scope

for the growth of unofficial markets, where prices were much
higher than those recorded officially.
There is no reason to expect price controls to be effective
in the open economies of the Caribbean.

The prices of imports

place a lower bound on the rate of domestic price increase.
Inflation beyond that derives from institutional arrangements
(distribution systems, customary markups and the degree of
monopoly) and from the level of intended spending by the
population.

Price controls may sometimes be used to reduce

margins if the power of monopolistic firms can be overcome, but
this will be a once for all shift which will not affect
subsequent trends in inflation.

It is futile to try to repress

prices when intended expenditures exceed the supply of goods and
services;

business will be forced on to unofficial markets which

feature higher prices, because consumers have the spending power
to pay in excess of the official price.

In these circumstances,

policies for expenditure reduction must be introduced;
take effect price controls become redundant.
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once they

The Guyana governmen t's strategy_f or stabilizin g the
economy and promoting growth was to replace private sector
initiative in major areas by a state owned, centrally planned
economic system.

The performan ce of the Guyanese economy since

the main elements of that system were introduced in 1976 suggests
that it has been a failure.

The Guyana governmen t lacked

sufficien t experience and highly skilled personnel, did not have
the required administr ative arrangeme nts and was inadequat ely
provided with informatio n systems needed for such a complex
undertakin g.

By 1985 the Guyana governmen t was once again

seeking private sector participa tion in major economic
enterpris es.
The most disappoin ting feature of adjustmen t policies in
the Caribbean has been the poor response of the supply of output.
Although real output was higher at the end of the period for a
few countries , none showed a vigorous and sustained growth in new
capacity.

The compositio n of exports was little changed, with

output subject to fluctuatio ns as at the beginning of the period.
The adjustmen t process did not achieve any changes in the
compositio n of exports that migh help to cushion future shocks
from abroad.

Guyana tried to achieve some diversific ation by

direct state investmen t, but none of governmen t's new ventures in
manufactu ring and agricultur e was a success.

The Trinidad and

Tobago governmen t also invested in new industry, geared for
export marketsr

the new enterprise s all had distinctly

unpromisin g starts, but for the moment they may be given the
benefit of doubts about their viability.
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Jamaica tried state

ownership in the mid-1970s , before retreating from governmen t
controlled investmen t as the driving force in new production at

.

the time of the first IMF programme in 1977.

From that time on

Jamaica used a variety of market-or iented policies - including
exchange rate and interest rate adjustmen t and wage guideline s in attempts to stimulate output.

Barbados placed emphasis on

institutio nal support for exporters - as did Jamaica - with
little by way of supply oriented macro-po licies.
provided protection for domestic industry.

All countries

The principal element

was the Caricom (Caribbean Economic Community ) external tariff,
applied uniformly by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago.

It provided tariff protection at rates ranging from

30-60% for manufactu ring destined for the regional market.

In

addition, investors in all Caricom countries were offered a
harmonize d system of fiscal incentive s.

Above this, individua l

countries imposed quantitati ve restrictio ns which varied greatly
between countries in content and use.
The governmen t investmen ts must be judged on their
individua l merits, while the institutio nal supports will take
effect only after a lapse of time:

consequen tly, most attention

focuses on the effects of macroecono mic policies such as exchange
rates, interest rates and protection .
Although Jamaica and Guyana were the only countries to
undertake active exchange rate manipulat ion, the constantly
changing relationsh ip between the exchange rates of industria l
countries means that a fixed peg in terms of any one implies
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variati on with respec t to all others.
exchang e rate variati on everyw here.

In this sense there was
Its probab le effects may be

inferre d by the way supply respond s to price change s, as
measure d by tests on an econom etric model.

The inferen ces may

not be valid for exchang e rates which are not though t credib le,
and the analys is does not take account of unoffi cial market s.
Becaus e of the pervas iveness of unoffi cial market s in Guyana we
are hesitan t to draw conclu sions from that countr y's experie nce,
but elsewh ere unoffi cial markets accoun ted for a small portion of
transac tions.
Exchan ge rate policy stimula tes output if it increas es the
prices of tradab les relativ e to those of non-tra dahles ,
pr~sum ing that it increas es their costs of produc tion to much the
same extent.

Demand for tradabl es is infini tely elastic , so if

i t proves more profita b~e to produc e, outpu~ can expand .

Estima tes for Barbad os, Jamaica and Trinida d and Tobago indica te
there should be increas es of the order of 6%, 1% and 5%,
respec tively, in the prices of. non-tra dables , for a 10%
devalu ation in the nation al currenc y.

In practic e, this gain was

obscure d in Jamaic a, where there was very little change in
relativ e prices over the 1977-83 period .

(Eviden ce for the

effects of the most recent round of exchang e rate change s,
beginn ing in 1983, is not yet availab le.)

Even where a change of

relativ e prices does appear, estima tes from the model indicat e
that the supply of output sometim es respond s very sluggis hly.
The elastic ities for Barbad os, and Trinida d and Tobago indica te
the output of tradab les is not affecte d, while output of
tradab les in Jamaic a appears to fall when their price rise.
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The

dema nd for non- trad able s does not incr ease
, altho ugh thei r pric es
tend to incr ease .a
Of coun tries arou nd the worl d with open elec
tora l syste ms,
only a hand ful are able to impl emen t nati onal
ly agre ed poli cies
on wage incr ease s.
Even thes e tend to brea k down in time s of
adve rsity .
It is not diff icul t to unde rstan d why this
migh t be.
Whil e all reas onab le citiz ens may be conv ince
d abou t the
mag nitud e of the gene ral wage incr ease , not
ever yone will agre e
that thei r rela tive remu nera tion on the day
of impl eme ntati on
shou ld be imm utab le.
The Jama ican gove rnme nt trie d on two
occa sion s to impl emen t nati onal wage guid elin
es.
In both case s
para llel targ ets for pric e incr ease s were
set at the same time
•
and work ers rega rded thei r acqu iesce nce to
wage guid elin es as
cond ition al on the pric e targ ets. This prej
udic ed chan ces of
succ ess, sinc e gove rnme nt has limi ted cont
rol of dom estic pric es,
give n the high impo rt cont ent of loca l prod
uctio n and fina l
cons ump tion. The firs t set of guid elin es,
intro duce d in 1978 ,
was adhe red to, with an incr easi ng numb er
of exce ptio ns, for a
litt le less than one year .
It was then aban done d.
No furt her
attem pt was made unti l 1984 , when the guid
elin es came unde r
pres sure almo st imm edia tely. Guya na was able
to come clos e to a
nati onal wage poli cy by virt ue of the exte
nt of stat e own ersh ip.
Wage s for a majo rity of work ers were froz en
betw een 1978 and
19A0 , and they have rise n much more slow ly
than the incr ease of
pric es duri ng the 1980 s. Guya na has gain ed
in com petit iven ess
beca use of the fall in real labo ur cost s,
thou gh this is yet to
have any effe ct on nati onal outp ut.

./
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Nation al wage guide lines are unlike ly to hold up for long
enough to secure m:>re than a tempo rary gain in compe titiven ess,
at best.

(The state contro lled econom y is an excep tion.)

It

seems more fruitf ul to explor e the wage determ inatio n proce ss,
which descri bes how worke rs react to econom ic circum stance s
and
how negot iation s betwee n thems elves and emplo yers result in
observ ed wage levels .

The autho rities may then try to influe nce

the factor s that play an impor tant role in wage determ inatio
n.
Sever al studie s of the proces s are now underw ay (McCle an and
Downe s ~1982 ], Boamah fl984 J).

One result that seems robus t is

the delaye d effect of inflat ion on wages .9

The autho rities may

do most to contai n wage increa ses by ensuri ng· ·that there are
no

1

domes tic pressu res to aggrav ate the impac t of impor t price
increa ses, which is the best they can expec t to achiev e by way
of
anti-i nflati onary polici es.
Intere st rate policy is frustr ated by the fact that
comm ercial bank rates have no measu rable effect s on the amoun
t of
financ e the public makes availa ble to firms.

In the three

count ries for which econo metric tests have been perfor med there
is no eviden ce to sugge st that people switch from spendi ng to
finan cial accum ulation as intere st rates chang e.10

Neithe r the

growth of financ ial liabil ities nor nation al expen diture shows
any
sensi tivity to intere st rates.

Intere st rates may determ ine

wheth er the public holds local depos its or financ ial instru ments
abroad , given foreig n intere st rates, but they do not affect
the
rate of finan cial accum ulatio n.

Furthe rmore , there is no
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eviden ce to sugge st that the rate of invest ment is affect ed
by ·
intere st rates.

There is not much eviden ce of an effect on

levels of outpu t either , and for fairly small intere st rate
change s the effec t may be"too small to matte r.

Howev er, it is

plaus ible to expec t that large shifts in intere st rate will
have
a notice able effect on cost functi ons, influe ncing the outpu
t of
tradab les and the price and outpu t of tradab les.

If this effec t

should prove signif icant - and it did not, up to the time of
the
very large increa se in Jamaic an intere st rates in 1984 - there
is
a case for a policy maint aining the lowes t intere st rate levels
that are feasib le, given foreig n intere st rate levels .
Measu res for indus trial protec tion were adopte d during the
period by Guyan a, Jamaic a and Trinid ad and Tobag o, in some
instan ces to conser ve foreig n exchan ge, and in others to shield
domes tic produ cers from region al compe tition.

The two

instru ments which contri buted almos t all the indus trial
protec tion in the Caribb ean were tariff s and quant itativ e
restri ction s.

Fisca l incen tives, intere st rate conce ssions and

subsid ies added very little extra prote ction.

Custom s tariff s

remain ed largel y unchan ged after count ries implem ented the 1973
Carico rn agreem ent for a common extern al tariff .

(It set up two

tariff regim es, one for Barbad os, Guyan a, Jamaic a and Trinid
ad
and Tobag o, and anoth er for all other Carico m membe rs.)

It is

the manip ulatio n of quant itativ e restri ction s which marks the
diverg ence in prote ctive polici es.

In Barbad os quant itativ e

restri ction s were----few-,. impose d on a limite d numbe r of items
and
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some times only for limit ed perio ds.

Guya na, on the othe r hand ,

impo sed comp rehen sive quot as and pros cript ions
of impo rts in
1974 , and they rema ined in force for the rema inder
of the perio d.
Jama ica intro duce d comp rehen sive quan titati ve
restr ictio ns in
1976 , and they rema ined in place for the rema inder
of the
deca de.
The majo rity were remov ed in the 1980 s. Unti l
1983
Trini dad and Toba go had only selec tive quan titiv
e cont rols on
impo rts, but in that year the net was cast very
wide ly.
This was
the only insta nce wher e the state d obje ctive was
to prot ect loca l
manu factu ring which could not comp ete with impo
rts from the rest
of the regio n. Jama ica and Guya na were prim arily
moti vated by a
desi re to cons erve forei gn exch ange .
As a resu lt of indi vidu alist ic polic ies on quan
titat ive
restr ictio ns, the degre e of prote ction varie d
from coun try to
coun try and among indu strie s with in part icula r
coun tries .
In
gene ral Guya na offer ed its prod ucers the high est
leve ls of
prot ectio n, follo wed in the 1970 s by Jama ica,
and in the 1980 s by
Trin idad and Toba go. The common exter nal tarif
f seem s to have
stim ulate d the prod uctio n and trade of labou r
inten sive ligh t
manu factu ring such as cloth ing, proce ssed foods
and cosm etics .
Trad e with in the regio n grew sign ifica ntly in
the secon d half of
the 1970 s, boos ting manu factu ring outp ut in the
large r coun tries
of the regio n.
Howe ver, these advan ces were lost with the
impo sitio n of quan titat ive restr ictio ns and regio
nal trade
decli ned in the 1980 s.

The quan titat ive restr ictio ns led to

gros s over prote ction of some indu stry, and perm
itted some high ly
inef ficie nt prod ucers to rema in in busin ess.
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On the whole , polic ies to incre ase outpu t in the Carib
bean
have not serve d the purpo se.

Indu strial prote ction made a

contr ibuti on to the growt h of manu factu ring, but it was
taken too
far, ultim ately suppo rting fragm entati on and ineff icien
cy.
Provi sions for new insti tutio ns to promo te and suppo
rt produ ction
and expor ts are thoug ht to be in the right direc tions
, but are
yet to bear tangi ble fruit .
Excha nge rate chang es have fuelle d
infla tion, witho ut doing much to stimu late outpu t.
Inter est
rates appea r to have had littl e signi fican t effec t in
the 197Os ,
thoug h we suspe ct they may prove stagf latio nary in the
198Os ,
inhib iting the outpu t of trada bles and infla ting the
price of
non-t radab les. Wage guide lines have not been succe ssful
ly
imple mente d.

Polic y-ma kers were affor ded a narro w scope for

affec ting the produ ction of trada bles, which are the
engin e that
drive s the econo my.
The outpu t of baux ite, alumi na and oil owes
littl e to dome stic cost varia tion, while sugar produ
ction was
inhib ited by a numhe r of facto rs apart from price .

Gover nment

polic ies were left to opera te on non-s ugar agric ultur
e,
manu factu ring and touris m.

Moreo ver, thoug h gover nmen t polic ies

may affec t outpu t, the degre e of prote ction is the only
facto r
which seems to influ ence inves tment decis ions.
Only two adjus tment packa ges seem to have been helpf
ul, in
the limit ed sense that the count ry survi ved a perio d
of
exter nally -indu ced stres s in no worse cond ition than
befor e the
shock (see the score card in exhib it 1).
and Barba dos, for the perio d 1981- 83.

The two were the Baham as
Trini dad and Tobag o's

1973- 74 progra mme might quali fy on groun ds that it provi
ded
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-su rplu ses for i.nv estm ent whi ch
cam e to fru itio n in the l 980 s,
wh ile Gu yan a's 197 8-8 0 adj ust me
nt pol icie s cam e clo se to
sat isf yin g the cri ter ion .
In the cas es of Guy ana in 196 6-6
7 and
Jam aic a bet wee n 197 4 and 197 6
pol icie s pro ved dis tin ctl y har
mfu l,
cre atin g a bal anc e of pay men ts
cri sis out of wha t mig ht hav e
bee n
tem por ary dis equ ilib riu m.
In the se two cou ntr ies , sub seq
uen t
pol ici es (Gu yan a, 198 0-8 4 and
Jam aic a, lq7 7-8 4) app ear to hav
e
fai led , but the y seem to hav e
bee n in the rig ht dir ect ion , unt
il
ver y rec ent ly.
In a num ber of oth er cas es dis
equ ilib ria pro ved
sel f-c orr ect ing , wh ile in oth ers
no ver dic t can be ent ere d,
eit her bec aus e adj ust me nt was
inv olu nta ry (th ere was no
ins tru me nt for dis cre tio nar y pol
icy ) or bec aus e the pol icy
·reg ime is of ver y rec ent vin tag
e.
The cha rac ter isti cs of the mos
t use ful pol icy reg ime s
inc lud e a fis cal pro gram me fea
tur ing mod est inc rea ses in
gov ern men t spe ndi ng, a sma ll def
ici t in rel ati on to GDP and a low
pub lic sec tor bor row ing req uir
em ent . Mo neta ry mea sur es inc lud
ed
ma nip ula tion of the dis cou nt rat
e, cha nge s in the res erv e
req uire me nt and cre dit res tric
tio ns.
Dis cou nts rem ain ed fre ely
ava ilab le and ban ks usu ally had
som e exc ess liq uid ity , so the
cre dit res tric tio ns alo ne wou ld
hav e bee n eff ect ive .
In the se
pro gra mm es the re was no act ive
exc han ge rat e cha nge , and con tro
ls
on for eig n tra de and fin anc e wer
e lib era lly adm inis tere d.
Ind ust ria l pro tec tio n was lim ited
to the eff ect
qua nti tat ive res tric tio ns cov erin
g a neg lig ibl e
inp uts . Adj ustm ent was ach iev
ed by res tra ini ng
dur ing the dow ntu rn in the tra
dab le sec tor s and
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of tar iff s, wit h
pro por tion of
exp end itur e
wa itin g for

extern al forces to stimua lte new growth.

In the case of Trinida d

and Tobago , expend iture was contain ed in the presen ce of a rapid
expans ion of income .
The worst episode s were charac terized by fiscal expans ion,
large deficts in relatio n to GDP and a high ratio of public
sector borrow ing to domest ic credit.

Moneta ry policie s were not

much differe nt from those in force where adjustm ent was rrore
helpfu l.

Exchang e rate adjustm ent was more active , with a

variety of schemes for deprec iating the rate.

Tight,

compre hensive contro ls were imposed on foreign transac tions and
sizeab le unoffi cial currenc y market s develop ed.

Lesson s From The Experie nce
The Caribbe an experie nce sugges ts that fiscal policy is at
once the most influe ntial and the one with greate st potent ial to
harm.

The world being an uncert ain place, conser vative fiscal

policie s seem to be best, to temper spendin g when output slips
and to increas e governm ent savings on curren t accoun t if there is
a windfa ll.

If the downtu rn proves of shorte r duratio n than

anticip ated or the upturn more robust, a governm ent will have
accumu lated reserve s which may be applied to investm ent~

if

events turn out worse than expecte d, the reserve s allow time to
take proper ly though t out measur es to avert a crisis .
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Governments have not proven very adept at stimu~ating
additional supplies of goods and services.

However, they have

the capacity to do great damage, should they fail to correct
external payments disequilibri a.

Supply responds strongly to

stimuli which government may not influence, such as export market
possibilitie s, social conditions and technology, and only weakly
to price-cost margins, which may be subject to official
manipulation .

Moreover, official control of price-cost margins

has not followed predictable patterns.
Government cannot transcend the limits set by external
markets and by
investors' autonomous decisions about the rate of
.
.

creation of new capacity.

Government's task is largely to • I

maintain national expenditure within the limits set by capacity
and output growth.

In the 1970s and 1980s this meant accepting

reduced economic prospects, compared with what seemed possible in
1970, and postponing hopes of reducing the outstanding chronic
unemployment .
The list of effective macroeconomi c policies available to
managers in small open economies is not long.

Fiscal policy is

both powerful and reasonably certain as to the outcome.

Exchange

rate changes and limited restrictions on credit, imports and
foreign exchange may be helpful, though their outcomes are not so
predictable, and they are accompanied by undesirable side
effects, particularly increased inflation.

If restrictions are

pressed too far they become ineffective and damaging as evasion
becomes widespread and inefficient black markets develop.
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Interest

rate policies and changes in reserve requirem ents do not seem to
help much.
If they are to do well, policy makers must pay attentio n
to institut ional strength s and managem ent capabil ities in the
public service.

Before embarkin g on a new course of action they

should provide themselv es the means of judging whether there
exists the ability to execute it.

The unreliev ed failures of

Guyana's nationa lised industri es are the Caribbe an's most
emphatic demonst ration of this point. Moreove r, the effectiv eness
with which existing policies are being impleme nted is in need of
frequent re-exam ination.
Economi sts and policy makers alike need to accept the
limits to policy making inherent in social and economic
processe s.

The economy is no more than a summary way of

represen ting what are thought to be central tendenc ies in the
evolutio n of certain kinds of contrac ts and exchang es.

These

transact ions are being undertak en continuo usly by thousand s of
actors, and it is impossib le to direct their behaviou r in any
determin ate sense.

Successf ul policy depends on understa nding

the interact ions and finding ways of influenc ing them, and is
most effectiv e when it convince s the agents to alter their course
of action.

Agents may be forced off-targ et to some degree, if

the nuisance is not great and they are not ferventl y attached to
their objectiv es.

But attempts to push beyond the limits they

will tolerate will be frustrat ed by one means to another.

To

identify the limits is the policy makers's essentia l challeng e.
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The En gli sh spe aki ng Car ibb ean
may hav e wis hed for a
be tte r dea l from the res t of
the wo rld dur ing the 197 0s and
198 0s. The se cou ntr ies wer e
ask ed to sho uld er a lar ge bur
den of
adj ust me nt, wit h cho ice s wh
ich stu nte d eco nom ic gro wth ,
wh ate ver
the pol icy c~o sen .
The pro spe ct of pro vid ing ade
qua te sta nda rds
of liv ing for the pop ula tio n
as a who le rec ede d dur ing the
las t
fif tee n yea rs, and eve ry cou
ntr y was for ced , at one tim e
or
ano the r, to tak e act ion s or
to end ure cir cum sta nce s wh ich
red uce d
liv ing sta nda rds and agg rav ate
d une mp loy men t pro ble ms .
Ne ver the les s, it rem ain s tru
e tha t the Car ibb ean as a wh
ole
sho uld hav e far ed be tte r tha
n it did , giv en the cir cum sta
nce s
whi <;h cou ntr ies wer e exp ose d.

Had po lic i1es bee n les s

adv ent uro us, the fal l in liv
ing sta nda rds for the lar ges
t
pro por tio n of the reg ion 's pop
ula tio n wou ld not hav e bee n
so
dra sti c, nor the cur ren t eco
nom ic pro spe cts so ble ak.
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to

Footno tes

1.

The countr ies examine d are Antigu a, the Bahama s, Barbad os,
Belize , Grenad a, Guyana , Domini ca, Jamaic a, Monste rrat,
St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincen t and Trinida d-Toba go.

2.

See Table 1.

3.

In 1984, debt service paymen ts (intere st and amorti sation)
absorbe d 30% of Jamaic a's gross foreign exchan ge earnin gs.
The compar ison of intere st rates and world price inflati on in
the 1980s is as follows :
1981 1982 1983
Intere st on public debt
(World Debt Tables 1985)
Price increas e fur
Tradab le goods

11.0

7.9

7.0

5.9

1.0

0.2 (est)

4.

The Jamaica n capita l, Kingst on, was plagued by sporad ic acts
of violenc e and politic al clashes in the late 1970s. The
lawles sness spread to the country side and some visito rs wer~
hurt. The country acquire d an unfavo urable image in the
travel industr y, and matter s were not improve d by the
govern ment's leftis t polici es, which were interp reted as
anti-w estern.

5.

For an analys is of the potent ial of Barbad os, Jamaic a and
Trinida d and Tobago under conditi ons simila r to those
prevai ling in the 1960s (with respec t to export s and the terms
of trade) , see append ix A.

6.

The coeffic ient of the relativ e price term is insign ificant
in estima tes of the import equatio n for Jamaic a, as well in
the estima te for expend iture on non-tra dable goods (Worre ll &
Holder (1984], p. 249).
Relativ e prices had neglig ible
effect s in Trinida d-Toba go as well. In Barbad os, import s are
sensiti ve to relativ e prices , but expend iture on
non-tra dables is not.

7.

The cost of credit is include d in equatio ns for estima ting
the output of tradab les, the expend iture on non-tra dables and
the supply of non-tra dables ;
in no case did it have a
signif icant effect (Worre ll & Holder , pp. 243-25 0).

8.

Worrel l & Holder , pp. 243-25 0, equatio ns (1) and (3) for each
countr y.
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9.

Worrell & Holder report a significant effect of prices,
lagged one period, on wages for Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago,
but not for Barbados (equation (10} - Trinidad - or (11};
Boamah reports significant price effects for Barbados with a
rather different specification (Boamah ~19841, p. 268}.

10. We may infer this from earlier evidence of the insensitivity
of expenditure to interest rate changes. For deposits we
test for the effect of differentials between domestic rates
and rates abroad, with an allowance for small discrepancies
between them; they were significant for Trinidad and Tobago,
but not for Barbados and Jamaica.
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Table 1
Hf1s:t 1 gf ,ban11 in ~~t1tn1l fati1b l11 gn lalancc gf Iu1h
(Milli ons of dollar ,, local curren cy)

lubadga
Import

Guyana

Price,

Export
Prices *

Terms of

(1)

(2)

(2) -(1)

Trade

Demand

Import

Factor s

Prices

Export
Prices

(Touris m)

Terms of
Trade

Demand
Factor s
(Baux ite,
Alumina)

1967

-10.9

0.5

11.4

5.5

1968

10.4

8.1

-2.3

9.2

1969

15.0

J.l

-11.9

8.7

1970

8.3

-4.8

-13.1

9.3

4. 7

6.7

2.0

14. 7

1971

14.5

2.9

-11.6

16.9

-0.1

7.1

7.2

-8.6

1972

18. 1

5.3

-12 .8

11.5

4.4

31.0

26.6

-27 .3

1973

56.9

-2.2

-59. 1

6.7

11.5

40.3

28.8

2.6

14.4

·/

1974

117.3

17.6

-99.7

5.3

26.6

90 .8

64.2

-6.4

1975

57.0

144.4

87.4

-6.2

35.2

248.4

213.2

5. 1

1976

60.9

-96. 9

-157.8

2.0

14.4

760.5

746.1

-98.0

1977

55.7

-0 .8

-56.5

33.4

-13.8

-221.8

-235.6

184.9

1978

32.5

1.2

-31.3

39 .4

-13.1

-36 .8

-49.9

22.1

1979

55.1

29.6

-25.5

47.2

17.4

58. 7

41.3

-50.8

1980

43.4

96.0

52.6

-1.1

34.0

213.3

179.3

48.4

1981

6 2. 9

-16.8

- 79. 7

- 2 3. 9

38.6

7.6

-31.0

-72.4

1982

15.1

-6. 8

-21.9

-73.1

n.a.

*Exclu des tourism
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n.a.

-146.2

gffecti ot·chan,c in External Variable• op Jalapcc of Irrui~
(Killio
n, of dollar• , local currenc y)

Jamaica

Trinidad aud Tobago

Import

lzport

Price ■

Price ■

1961

6.7

-1.3

-8.0

-21.8

1962

13.6

3.0

-10.6

-28.5

10.6

10.6

-33.3

1963

Term• of
Trade

Demand
Factor•
(Bz,al,
tour)

1964

6.6

-4.0

-10.6

-3 .1

1965

2.5

-7.4

-10.0

-4.8

1966

8.1

3.4

-4.7

-18.5

4.4

-7.1

-35.7

1967

Import
Price,. ,.

Export
Price••

Term• of
Trade

Demand
Factor•
(Oil)

1968

14.7

26.1

11.5

-34.3

1969

25.1

2.4

-22.6

-1.6

1970

11.4

29.0

17 .5

23.3

14.7

5.6

-9.1

-43 .1

1971

39.1

-2.1

-41.1

-18.5

41.l

48.9

7.9

-17.6

1972

20.8

0.4

-20.4

-3.8

32.8

4.2

-28.6

-16.1

1973

192.7

55.0

-137.6

-33.5

61.7

117 .1

55.3

216.4

1974

294.8

183.2

-111.6

2.4

753.7

977 .9

224.2

1002.6

1975

99.5

325.7

226.1

-242.9

218.1

230.5

12.3

968 .2

1976

55.8

-50.4

-106.2

-356 .1

401.9

352.5

-49.3

321.4

1977

120.7

29.9

-90.6

4.4

75.4

231.2

155.7

622.0

1978

16.8

427.1

410.3

16.5

141.4

-6.7

-148.1

-112.7

1979

205.7

351.8

146 .1

-106.6

397 .3

968. 7

571.4

1810.6

1980

481.7

188.6

-293 .1

-48.0

2432 .6

2898.0

465.4

2210.8

1981

123.6

-7.2

-130.8

-44.0

909.2

714.9

-194.3

-631.2

1982

26 • 7

4 2 •6

15 • 9
- 358•0
61 7 . 8
- 4 5 0 • 9 -10 6 .8 • 7 -14 9 3 . 4
'lhfrExcluding imports of crude oil for refinin g
+Based on exports net of crude oil imports
Note: based on values in (t-1) times percent age changes in prices or output
in (t).
Source s: Centra l Bank of Barbad os, Annual Statist ical Digest and Balance
of
Payments; International Financial Statist ics; UN Yearbook of International Trade
Statis tics; IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook (Detail s availab le on reques
t).
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Effects

(1)

Table 2
Selecte d Policie s

Approx iaate effects of fiscal pro1rU111e to increas e GDP by 1, (direct
10Tern aent actiTit y)

Chana• in total GDP

c,)

Chan1e in GDP deflato r

Bdos

1a

TT

1.99

1

1

c,>

Chan1e in iaporta (')
(2)

of

0.96 0:A/y

7.23

1.08

0.83

Approx imate effects of an increas e in 1ov't transfe r paymen ts which
adds
the equiva lent of 1, of GDP to the expend iture stream, evenly distriu
bted
between additio nal spendin g on imports and on non-tra dables.
Bdos

Ja

TT

0.49
Change in deflato r
Change in imports (") .

(3)

0.48 Qn./y
2.29

o.s

o.s

Approx imate effects of tax increas es that reduce disposa ble income
by 1, of

GDP

Bdos

Ja

TT

-0.99
Change in GDP deflato r (')

Change in impor ts(')
(4)

0.96 0:A/y
-7 .23

-1.08

-0.83

Approx imate measur es of the impact of changes in monetar y instrll.l llents;
impact on cost of borrowi ng
Bdos

Ja

TT

arJaCrp (Credit limits)

0.004

ar/aq (Reserv e require ments)

0.004D

ar/arb (Discou nt rate)

0.057

ar/arg( Gov't note rate)

D: bank deposi ts
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Table 2 continued ••••
(5).

The effect, of chanaea in the coat of borrowina .
Effect on (elasticit y)

Bdoa

Output of tradablea

1&

TT

0.87

Output of non-trada bles

Price of non-trada blea
(6)

The effect, of a 1°'9 currency devaluati on
Bdos

On the prices of tradables (,)

1a

0.61

1.00

On the demand for imports( ')

1.71

-1.33

On national output (')

0.67

-1.23

6.84

5 .94'

TT
3 .47

On the demand for non-trada bles(,)

09"

On the GDP deflatMe (')

Note:

4.19

Impact multiplie rs derived from estimates reported in Worrell and Bolder
. [1984]
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Exhibit l

Outcome, of Adjustment Policie1
Helpful

Harmful

No Ycnfic t

Automatic

Adjustment
Bdoa, 81-83

Guy, 76 ,77

Guy, 79-84

TT, 82+

Bdos, 73-7S

Bah, 81-83

Jca, 74-76

Jca, 77-84

Dom, 80+

Guy, 73-7S

TT, 73-74

St K., 80+

St. L., 80+

Guy, 78-80?

Ant., 80+

Mont, 80+

Blze, 80+
St. V., 80+

Gren., 80+
Note: "Helpful" policies served to cushion external shock and leave the country no
weaker than before. "Harmful" policies were worse than "failures" because they
aggravated the consequence s of the shock, where failed policies simply were of no
assistance. No verdict can be entered when policies are quite recent or data for
full analysis of the1r impact is limited.
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Appendix

A Kethodolo1y for

Si ■ ulatin1

the Effects of E1ternal Shocks

Be3in by aol~in1 the price-outpu t relationship s of the Worrell-Bol der
(198.. ] aodel to 1ive national income as a function of exports, export
prices and import prices.

The model is modified to disaggregat e the price

of tradables into export and import prices.

Between 8°'9 and 9°'9 of

tradable output is exported, for all the countries so far tested; we
approximate by equating the production of exports and the output of

tradables.

Writing all relationship s in rates of change, we have

(Al)

lt

= ao

(A2)

Go = bo

(A3)

PD = co + C1Gn_ + C2Pm + C3S + C4r

(A4)

y

(AS)

Pt = 13:s.Px + flmPm

+ al PX + a2Pm + a S + a r
3
4
+ bly + b2(Pm - Pm> + b3Qn(-l)

I

= «x X

+ 0.n QD

The variables are (reading across):
x

exports

P

price indices; the GDP deflator (below) has no subscript;
other prices are indicated by subscripts

m

imports

s

a measure of unit labour costs

r

the cost of bank finance

Q

output; subscript indicates which sector

.n

non-tradabl es

y

national income

t

tradables

«x,

«n:

~x• ~11 :

share of x and

<1n in y

share of x and min (x + m)
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All variables are in real

te~■ s.

The first equation estimates the

supply of exports. the second the demand for non-trada ble aoods as
perceived by firms in that sector, and the third measures the supply price
of non-trada bles, once firms determine their response to the expected
demand.

These relationsh ips aay be solved for income as a function of

exports and the terms of trade (the prices of exports and imports).

The

solution is of the form

where Ai are combinatio ns of the estimated coefficie nts, the a's and the

~•s.
The first exercise carried out was to determine the effects of
weakness in the markets for those commoditi es (bauxite, alumina, oil,
tourism) where output is not determine d predomina ntly by supply factors.
To do this, we adjusted the export series, replacing the actual exports of
these commoditi es with values based on straight line projectio ns of the
trends of the 1960s.
resulted, using (A6).

We then derive the growth of income which would have
This procedure depends on the notion that the

export sector is the essential engine of growth.

We test for the

feasibili ty of the resulting income series by working out the implicati ons
for savings and investmen t and for the governmen t budget.
The investmen t required to sustain the growth rate is derived from an
increment al capital output ratio, based on observatio ns averaged over the
period of analysis.

Some judgment is necessary to eliminate extreme

values of the ICOR.

The existence of spare capacity in all industrie s

means that output can expand at any time (in theory) without additiona l
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capital foraation .

However, Ye doubt this will be true over an eztended

period, because of the need for

■ odernisation.

(Also, the depreciat ion

series are often deficient , and Ye need to use aross capital formation .)
Private sector savinas are derived usina savinas propensit ies culled from

previous studies (for Barbados and Jamaica) and simple ratios elsewhere .
Governme nt's current consumpti on expenditu re is taken at the observed
levels, and revenues are derived from the function

i.v =

(A7)

do + d1(P + y)

where Pis the GDP deflator given by

Assuming that governmen t capital expenditu re approxima tes governmen t fixed
capital formation (where it clearly does not, and current spending is
classifie d in the capital budget, adjustmen ts can be made) the current
account (deflated by P) provides a measure of governmen t saving.
The remaining funds for the investmen t programme come from
foreigner s.

Together with exports and imports they indicate what the

impact on foreign ezchange reserves will be.

Imports are derived from

The reserves derived from these calculatio ns are compared with a reserves
target.

We chose a minimum reserve level of zero; it is easy to adjust

the simulatio ns for any other.
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To keep reserves ab9ve taraet, the authori ties may cut iaports by

increasi na their relative prices or cut aovern.a ent consump ~ion to increase
officia l savings and reduce imports.

Alterna tively, the arowth rate may

slow down, either by delibera te policy or by the requirem ents of external
balance .

We may calculat e the changes in each case which would be

sufficie nt to allow for a feasible combina tion of income arowth and
foreign exchange use.

The best feasible option (the one with the fastest

rate of growth) is compared with the actual outcome s.
The whole exercise is then repeated for import and export prices,
substitu ting for

x

from equation (Al) to obtain a replacem ent

=or ~quation

(A6):

(AlO)

where the Bi are combina tions of the Ai and ai.
In the accompan ying charts the variable s represen ting actual outcomes
(Y, DR) have no number; simulati ons for alternat ive export demand patterns
appear with a one (Yl, DR!) and those for the alternat ive terms of trade
appear with a two.
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